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Abstract
This thesis focuses on analysing the collision avoidance system called
TCAS. We implement the TCAS functionality and a parametrised model
of the pilot response and introduce methods to verify its functionality. We
introduce a parametrised model of aircraft encounters for the purpose of
simulation. First, the collision avoidance logic functionality is tested and
verified in a discrete simulation using various scenarios. Then, the collision
avoidance system is integrated within an air traffic simulation using the pre-
cise BADA aircraft dynamics model and the parametrised pilot response
model which allows the testing of various reaction delays. Both single and
multiple-threat encounters and both uncoordinated and TCAS-TCAS en-
counters are simulated, and delay-related limitations of the collision avoid-
ance system’s functionality are estimated.
Abstrakt
Pra´ce se soustrˇed´ı na analy´zu palubn´ıho protisra´zˇkove´ho syste´mu TCAS.
Popisuje implementaci parametrizovane´ho modelu reakc´ı pilota, TCAS
mechanismu a metody pouzˇite´ k oveˇrˇen´ı funkcˇnosti protisra´zˇkove´ho
syste´mu. Da´le je popsa´n parametrizovany´ model pro strˇetnut´ı letadel v
letecke´m prostoru, ktery´ je pouzˇit pro generova´n´ı sce´na´rˇ˚u pro testova´n´ı
funkcˇnosti protisra´zˇkove´ho syste´mu. Nejdrˇ´ıve je syste´m otestova´n v
jednoduche´ diskre´tn´ı simulaci pouzˇit´ım r˚uznorody´ch sce´na´rˇ˚u. Pote´ je pro-
tisra´zˇkova´ logika integrova´na do simulace letecke´ho provozu, ktera´ pouzˇ´ıva´
prˇesne´ BADA modely dynamiky letoun˚u. Pro kontrolu letounu je zde inte-
grova´n parametrizovany´ model reakc´ı pilota, ktery´ umozˇnˇuje testovat r˚uzne´
typy zpozˇdeˇn´ı. Nekoordinovane´ i TCAS-TCAS strˇety s jedn´ım i v´ıce ciz´ımi
letouny jsou odsimulova´ny k prozkouma´n´ı efektu parametr˚u zpozˇdeˇn´ı na
schopnosti protisra´zˇkove´ho syste´mu udrzˇet separaci.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1
Introduction
The topic of this bachelor’s thesis is the analysis of the airborne collision avoidance
system called Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). In the following paragraphs, we
will briefly summarise the background of the development of TCAS, its value for today’s
general air traffic and its potential for the development of future systems.
Since the last century, the main system for organising air traffic and preventing colli-
sions between aircraft in controlled airspace has been Air Traffic Control (ATC). Air traffic
controllers stationed at control towers plan flight paths for aircraft in their sector of con-
trolled airspace to ensure air traffic separation. However, with the rise of air traffic, there
have been accidents where ATC failed to prevent the loss of separation between aircraft. In
1956 the ATC system did not manage to ensure the separation between two airliners over
the Grand Canyon resulting in a collision. This disaster encouraged the airlines and avia-
tion authorities to begin developing an effective collision avoidance system. Such a system
should act as the last resort, preventing collisions when separation services provided by ATC
fail [23]. Since then, many collision avoidance systems have been designed. Currently, the
only implementation of the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) standard for
an Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS II) is TCAS II version 7.1. This version of
TCAS is currently used worldwide by most large commercial aircraft. Eurocontrol assessed
the safety benefits of TCAS for Europe and found that it reduces the risk of mid-air collision
approximately five times [7].
TCAS is an onboard system which collects information about nearby airborne traffic
and uses it to detect the loss of separation which can occur due to a failure in the ATC system,
for example. When it detects any danger of collision, it issues alerts to the pilot and advises
them on how to react to the situation.
1.1 Motivation and Goals
We are interested in using a parametrised encounter simulation to find specific bound-
aries where the TCAS logic starts losing the ability to ensure separation. Increasing air traffic
density causes new types of encounters which cannot be reflected by analyses using encounter
modelling based on the recorded encounters from the radar sites. For example, multiple-threat
encounters are already not as rare as was originally expected [13].
There has been an increase in development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) since the
beginning of the 21st century, which was supported by many factors, like the extreme increase
1
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in navigation accuracy thanks to the Global Positioning System or faster microprocessors [5].
This naturally motivated many analyses on the subject of using the knowledge gained from
the many years of development and tuning of TCAS to modify it for the use of UAVs. We
are interested if the collision avoidance system based on the TCAS logic combined with an
autonomous model of the pilot response could be effective.
This thesis aims to:
• Analyse the collision avoidance logic of TCAS.
• Implement the TCAS functionality and verify the implementation.
• Integrate the collision avoidance logic implementation into a system of air traffic simu-
lation.
• Design a model of the pilot response which parametrises various delays.
• Assess the collision avoidance system’s functionality using various encounter scenarios.
1.2 Structure
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 describes the surveillance systems
that are used to share information between aircraft and ground stations, focusing on transpon-
ders, which are crucial for providing data to the collision avoidance system’s logic. That is
followed by Chapter 3 which describes TCAS itself, mainly focusing on explaining the prin-
ciples of the collision detection and resolution logic. Chapter 4 describes the state of the art
providing insight on the methodology of collision avoidance systems’ safety analysis. It also
declares the methods that are used in this thesis to analyse TCAS. Chapter 5 introduces
our implementation of the collision avoidance logic and shows methods used to verify the
functionality of the subsystems within the collision avoidance system. Chapter 6 introduces
the encounter parametrisation. Then, it is used in discrete encounter simulation using simple
aircraft dynamics modelling. Various scenarios are simulated in order to verify the collision
avoidance logic. Chapter 7 describes the integration of the collision avoidance system and
pilot response model within the precise air traffic simulation, and then uses the simulation to
analyse and verify the collision avoidance system.
The abbreviations used throughout this thesis are listed in Table 2 at the end of the
document.
2
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Chapter 2
Air Traffic Surveillance
TCAS utilises a mode S transponder that performs surveillance of nearby aircraft to
provide information such as the relative position, bearing or altitude of these aircraft. This
data is then used as an input for the collision avoidance system. It is collected independently
of ATC using various modes of onboard transponders that the aircraft are equipped with.
The transponder controlled by TCAS operates by transmitting interrogations at 1030
MHz which are received by the nearby aircraft’s transponders which then replies with a
response at 1090 MHz that contains information dependent on the capabilities of the re-
sponding transponder’s mode [23]. The transponder mode of the aircraft which is a threat
to the TCAS-equipped aircraft (they shall be further referred to as ”threat” or ”intruder”)
directly corresponds to the level of services TCAS is able to provide for dealing with that
particular aircraft, because transponders differ in what information they are able to provide,
when they respond to an interrogation.
2.1 Transponder Interrogation Modes
Generally, TCAS is not able to provide protection against aircraft without an operating
transponder, but in controlled airspace, transponders are considered mandatory equipment
for general air traffic. For example, since 2011 the European Commision requires operating
transponders of at least Mode S level for general air traffic [6].
2.1.1 Mode A/C without Altitude Reporting
The simplest transponder mode with which TCAS is able to cooperate is Mode A/C
without altitude reporting. When interrogated, the transponder replies with a ”squawk code”,
which is a 12 bit-long code that should serve as a unique identification of the aircraft.
2.1.2 Mode C
Mode C expands on Mode A by adding information about barometric altitude in the
reply to an interrogation. The altitude resolution in this case is 100 feet expressed as the
standard pressure altitude called flight levels (FLs). Different FLs correspond to hundreds of
3
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feet, e.g., FL 250 means a pressure altitude of 25 000 feet. The identification code is still just
12 bits long allowing 4096 unique codes, which is not enough for today’s traffic.
2.1.3 Mode S
Mode S is compatible with both previously mentioned modes, and it provides the baro-
metric altitude as Mode C does. Additionally, short messages called squitters are used to
carry various pieces of information between Mode S transponders. Mainly altitude with a 25
feet resolution, ICAO address or flight status. Mode S transponders replaced the squawk code
with a 24 bit-long permanent ICAO address which serves as a globally unique identification
code. The ICAO address is registered to an aircraft, and it does not normally change. En-
hanced versions of Mode S (EHS) are capable of transmitting extended squitters containing
advanced information like ground speed, roll angle or rate of climb/descend, which are very
valuable for TCAS as they provide improved awareness of the situation [9].
2.1.4 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
ADS-B is a surveillance technology which helps air traffic participators share informa-
tion about their position, velocity etc. This system relies on Mode S transponders to transmit
data collected by individual aircraft using the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS).
For an illustration of ADS-B communication see Figure 2.1.
Its functionality is split into two parts called ’ADS-B out’ and ’ADS-B in’. Aircraft with
active ADS-B out broadcast extended squitters filled with data collected from GNSS. The
frequency of position and velocity updates is 0.5 seconds [4]. The accuracy is much better than
with data collected from radar-based systems and onboard devices, for example, it provides
geometric height with a resolution of 6.25 feet [20]. The data transmitted by ADS-B out is
collected by aircraft with operating ADS-B in and can even be rebroadcasted further (ADS-R
function).
Aircraft may have ADS-B out without having ADS-B in but not vice versa as without
the ADS-B out function ground bases and other aircraft would not register the aircraft, and
therefore would not respond with information for the aircraft’s ADS-B in.
ADS-B out is not received and processed just by aircraft but by ground stations too.
These ground stations then share the information with ATC and other ground stations.
Ground stations also collect information from primary surveillance radar and other systems.
With all this data the ground stations are able to collect, they play an important part in
the whole ADS-B system by providing a service called Traffic Information Service - Broadcast
(TIS-B). When a ground station taking part in the TIS-B system receives ADS-B out from an
aircraft in range (usually 55 NM), it selects data about the traffic surrounding this particular
aircraft from all the data it collected using various systems. It then transmits this customized
package of information to its location. The dimensions and the shape of the area around the
target aircraft that are covered by TIS-B are illustrated in Figure 2.2.
4
CHAPTER 2. AIR TRAFFIC SURVEILLANCE
Figure 2.1: ADS-B communication illustration (borrowed from [16])
Figure 2.2: Area coverage of a TIS-B service around target aircraft (borrowed from [1])
2.1.5 TCAS Interaction with Transponders
When confronted with threats equipped with a transponder without altitude reporting,
TCAS is able to warn the pilot about potentially dangerous traffic nearby (so-called traffic
advisory, TA) [22]. Because the altitude is not provided by this type of transponder, TCAS is
forced to expect the worst possible scenario, and it is likely to issue unnecessary alerts while
an aircraft with such a transponder is passing way below or above its own aircraft. TCAS is
not able to calculate and advise the best manoeuvre to avoid collision (so-called resolution
advisory, RA), because it lacks the data needed to do so. Both TA and RA services will be
described in greater detail later in Chapter 3 focusing on TCAS itself.
5
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While dealing with a threat equipped with a Mode C transponder, TCAS II visualises
the approximate relative position of the threat on a display and is able to provide both traffic
and resolution advisory. For an illustration of the TCAS display’s visualisation of threats see
Figure 3.1. TCAS interrogates the Mode C aircraft once per second to get a position update.
When TCAS II encounters a Mode S intruder both TA and RA are provided to the
pilot. The update frequency differs depending on the distance and closure rate of the threat,
once per 5 seconds for distant threats and once per second for closer ones. If available, more
detailed and accurate data is transmitted using extended squitters.
The ADS-B system definitely enlarges TCAS’s potential as it provides it with very fre-
quent and accurate data updates on surrounding traffic, which enables the collision avoidance
system to deal with threats in the most effective way. Through TIS-B, TCAS is able to obtain
data about the position of even unequipped aircraft. It is expected that in the future, ACAS
X, the system which could replace TCAS II one day, will be focused on making extensive
use of ADS-B and satellite-based navigation. The high update rate and data accuracy should
also make it possible to design a collision avoidance system solely for the needs of unmanned
aircraft (ACAS Xu) [17].
6
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Chapter 3
TCAS Description
TCAS is a collision avoidance system that was designed to reduce the risk of mid-air
collisions. It has been designed as an implementation of the ICAO ACAS II standard. ICAO
states that the only applicable commercial implementation of the ACAS II standard is TCAS
II and since January 2017 at least version 7.1 is required.[21]
TCAS acts as the last resort system to avoid collisions in the case of loss of separation
due to a failure of the ATC system. It tracks trajectories of possible threats and helps the
pilot avoid them using TAs and RAs. We will briefly describe how TCAS logic works in the
means of detection of threats, issuing advisories and choosing the right vertical manoeuvre.
For more information about the overall system functionality, see document [23]. A detailed
description of the advisory algorithms can be found in document [15].
Figure 3.1: Illustration of the TCAS display of advisories (borrowed from [5])
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3.1 Threat Detection
3.1.1 Advisories Concept
TCAS tracks the position and velocity of nearby aircraft and detects if any of them
entered the protected volume of airspace around the ownship. Ownship is a term used to refer
to the TCAS-equipped aircraft from whose point of view we describe the collision avoidance
logic. Similarly, the other aircraft in the described encounters are referred to as threats or
intruders.
Figure 3.2: Illustration of threat detection volume around the ownship (borrowed from [10])
When a threat is approaching, TCAS issues a TA, which should raise the pilot’s aware-
ness of the threat and help them track the threat’s movement. It does so by visualising the
threat’s approach on a display. Later, if the intruder moves even closer to the ownship, an RA
is issued, which recommends the best vertical manoeuvre to the pilot in order to maintain
the minimum allowed vertical separation (Altitude LIMit abbreviated as ALIM) at the hor-
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izontal Closest Point of Approach (CPA). For an illustration of the TCAS display advisory
visualisation see Figure 3.1. The shape of the area and the composition of advisory regions
where nearby aircraft are detected as threats is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
An RA is often in contradiction to ATC instructions and pilots should always comply
with TCAS, returning to the previous ATC clearance only after TCAS announces ”clear of
conflict” [11].
3.1.2 Issuance Conditions
Everytime TCAS receives a new position update on nearby aircraft, it inspects the
data to test if an advisory should be issued. From the data, TCAS derives relative distance,
closure rate, time to CPA and time to the moment when both aircraft reach the same al-
titude (so-called time to co-altitude). Simply put, the detection logic works by testing if
any nearby aircraft are close enough (relative horizontal/vertical distance lower than the
DMOD1/ZTHR2 threshold) or approaching fast enough (time to CPA/time to co-altitude
lower than the TAU3 threshold) in both the horizontal and the vertical sense at once. For
an illustration of the thresholds that form the advisory region see Figure 3.3. To filter out
unnecessary advisories a conflict detection 2-D algorithm (CD2D)[15] is used as it confirms if
the horizontal separation limit will be broken in the currently predicted flight path.
Figure 3.3: Illustration of thresholds forming the advisory detection area — the TAU threshold
is compared with the time to CPA approximation (τmod) and with the time to co-altitude,
DMOD and ZTHR thresholds are compared with horizontal and vertical distance, respectively.
Aircraft within the area violate the separation and are considered to be intruders
1Distance MODified - horizontal distance threshold
2vertical distance (Z axis) THReshold
3time threshold used in both horizontal and vertical case
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The simple concept of collision avoidance logic is enhanced significantly by usage of the
modified tau (τmod) concept [14] which is used by TCAS. Instead of calculating the time to
CPA by simply dividing the relative horizontal distance by closure rate, it uses the following
formula
τmod(~d,~v) ≡ −‖
~d‖2 −DMOD2
~d · ~v
, (3.1)
where ~d,~v are vectors of relative horizontal distance and velocity.
The main reason τmod was introduced is because of the problem with slow closure rate
intruders [23]. The illustration of the trajectories where usage of the τmod concept improves
the collision avoidance logic is depicted in Figure 3.4. If an intruder and the ownship have
low relative horizontal velocity, the calculated time to CPA will be very high even at close
distances. Because of that, the time to CPA will not decrease under the TAU value, and an
advisory will not be issued. Intruders like these would get very close to the ownship without
raising alerts until they passed the DMOD horizontal distance boundary. This causes potential
danger, since the unaware ownship/intruder may start decelerating/accelerating resulting in
a potential collision within the next few seconds. In that case, an advisory would be issued,
but there would be no guarantee of the pilot having enough time to react to the RA.
The advantage gained by introducing τmod is that the logic now focuses more on having
enough time to react before an intruder even passes the DMOD boundary. The collision
(a) Slow overtake (b) Slow horizontal approach
Figure 3.4: Illustration of trajectories in which the τmod concept is needed
avoidance logic then does not rely on protecting just one point in space, where the ownship
is expected to be, but rather a small area defined by the DMOD and ALIM thresholds (the
ALIM threshold is illustrated in Figure 3.5, its function is described further in this chapter).
τmod is always higher than the time to the CPA. For higher closure rates the τmod will work
almost the same as the time to CPA because DMOD is a very small distance compared to
common horizontal ranges and closure rates. In the low closure rates case using τmod instead
of the time to CPA is likely to gain a few seconds for the pilot’s reaction.
3.1.3 Threshold Parameters
The shape and size of the protected volume is defined by the relative velocity of the
aircraft and also by the thresholds TAU, DMOD and ZTHR. TAU defines how many seconds
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before reaching the CPA or co-altitude TCAS should issue a specific advisory. DMOD similarly
defines what the relative horizontal distance in which an advisory should be issued is, and
ZTHR acts as a vertical distance boundary for the same purpose. The last threshold important
for the TCAS threat detection logic is ALIM, a minimum vertical separation at the CPA that
the collision avoidance logic is aiming to provide with manoeuvres recommended by an RA.
The value of these threshold parameters is dependent on the current sensitivity level.
The reason to establish sensitivity levels is to provide a customized amount of protection
corresponding to the current situation. An effective collision avoidance system must maintain
the level of protection without issuing too many unnecessary advisories which could cause
large deviations from ATC routes. Sensitivity levels help react to threats in an optimal way
[23]. The sensitivity level corresponds to the current ownship’s altitude. With higher altitude
comes a higher sensitivity level causing an increase in size of the protected volume surrounding
the ownship.
Table 3.1: Threshold values for different sensitivity levels [23]
Zone
Current
Altitude (feet)
Sensitivity
Level
TAU
(sec)
DMOD
(NM)
ZTHR
(feet)
ALIM
(feet)
TA RA TA RA TA RA RA
1 0 - 1000 2 20 NaN 0.30 NaN 850 NaN NaN
2 1000 - 2350 3 25 15 0.33 0.20 850 600 300
3 2350 - 5000 4 30 20 0.48 0.35 850 600 300
4 5000 - 10000 5 40 25 0.75 0.55 850 600 350
5 10000 - 20000 6 45 30 1.00 0.80 850 600 400
6 20000 - 42000 7 48 35 1.30 1.10 850 700 600
7 42000 - ∞ 7 48 35 1.30 1.10 1200 800 700
In Table 3.1 the values of the thresholds are shown. From the values, we can see that at
altitudes lower than 1000 feet TCAS RAs are inhibited. That is because of the close vicinity
aircraft have to be in, while taking off or landing. We can also see that TCAS advisories are
configured to be issued just tens of seconds before a potential collision.
3.2 Conflict Resolution
When a threat is detected and an RA is issued, TCAS has to choose the correct way to
address the situation. Since the current versions of TCAS are only capable of advising vertical
manoeuvres, the strategy is to extrapolate horizontal trajectories and choose a manoeuvre
that would ensure that at the time when aircraft are closest horizontally, the minimum ALIM
vertical separation will be maintained to avoid a collision. The TCAS logic uses a linear
extrapolation of the intruder’s trajectories based on their current velocity as it has no way of
knowing the other pilot’s intentions. When extrapolating the trajectory of its own aircraft,
parabolic extrapolation is used. It is based on the assumption that the pilot will initially
respond with a 0.25 g (gravitational acceleration) acceleration manoeuvre [19]. For the possible
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consequent ROCD increases and RA reversals, 0.35 g acceleration is assumed to be used [19].
Naturally, during the selection of a correct advisory, the biggest priority is preventing a
collision which is realised by ensuring the ALIM separation. In the rare cases where at least
the ALIM amount of vertical separation cannot be provided, the corrective RA providing the
largest possible vertical separation is issued. A major factor is keeping deviation from the cur-
rent flight path as small as possible and also reducing the amount of deviations [23]. In dense
terminal areas, a high amount of unnecessary alarms might render the system inapplicable
because unnecessary manoeuvres might be causing new alerts.
3.2.1 RA Type Selection
There are two types of resolution advisories, preventive and corrective. Preventive advi-
sories do not require the pilot to manoeuvre, they only warn the pilots about manoeuvres that
should not be executed. A good example might be a threat that is a few flight levels above
the ownship maintaining the current vertical separation. Such intruders might pass through
the ZTHR zone and raise alerts, but since they are not getting any closer vertically, there is
no imminent danger of them passing through the critical ALIM zone, meaning no manoeuvre
is needed. The described example is illustrated in Figure 3.5
Figure 3.5: Preventive RA example situation
In this case, TCAS would issue a preventive RA restricting the pilot from climbing.
These advisories are a good way of preventing the pilot from starting a manoeuvre which
might be difficult to reverse by a corrective RA quickly enough to avoid a collision. To decide
whether the RA is corrective or not, TCAS calculates the vertical separation at the CPA and
compares it with the current ALIM. If the expected vertical separation is lower than ALIM,
a corrective advisory is issued.
3.2.2 RA Sense Selection
After the corrective advisory is issued, TCAS chooses the direction of the manoeuvre.
It does so by extrapolating the trajectories for both the downward and the upward RA sense
and by calculating the vertical separation at the CPA for both. If both of them are expected
to provide at least the ALIM separation, then the non-altitude crossing RA sense is selected.
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Figure 3.6: Selection of non-crossing RA sense (borrowed from [23])
That means that if the initial ownship’s altitude is higher than the threat’s altitude, a climb is
preferred even when the descend provides a larger vertical separation as shown in Figure 3.6.
If only one of the RA senses provides the ALIM separation, then it is preferred. Finally, if
neither of the senses is able to provide the ALIM separation, the one with the larger vertical
separation at the CPA is preferred.
TCAS expects the pilot to react to an initial RA within approximately 5 seconds. The
reaction delay to subsequent RAs is expected to be lower, about 2.5 seconds [23]. As the
encounter continues, TCAS keeps getting new position updates, and if the situation does
not go according to predictions, TCAS issues subsequent RAs to adjust the manoeuvre. For
example, after the intruder has changed his rate of climb/descend, TCAS might issue an
increase/decrease of the vertical rate to maintain the ALIM separation. If the current RA
sense is not able to provide ALIM anymore, a reversal RA might be issued, advising the pilot
to change the climb to descend or vice versa as illustrated in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: Reversal RA invoked by the threat’s change in the rate of descend (borrowed
from[23])
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If TCAS notices that an unnecessary amount of separation was gained by the manoeu-
vre, it is designed to weaken the initial manoeuvrer to prevent a bigger deviation from the
original flight path than needed.
For an illustration, the different types of RA for the downward sense are listed in
Table 3.2 with their corresponding aural alerts. The RAs for the upward sense use the same
vertical rate ranges, the only difference is that they are positive. As shown in Table 3.2 the
ROCD range is from -4400 to 4400 feet/min. TCAS assumes that the aircraft is capable of
reaching ROCDs within this range.
Table 3.2: RA categories (borrowed from [21])
3.2.3 Multiple-threat Encounters
When dealing with multiple intruders at once, TCAS uses a similar logic as in a single-
threat encounter. It calculates the separate CPAs of all intruders and then it prioritises the
manoeuvre that will keep at least the ALIM separation from all threats at the corresponding
CPAs. In those encounters, it is not that unlikely to just choose a manoeuvre providing the
biggest separation possible, because ALIM cannot be reached with all intruders. It is also
possible to use a composition of RAs. For example, the aircraft might be avoiding a threat
from below by climbing 1000 feet/min, but at the same time be restricted from vertical rates
over 2000 feet/min, because another threat is above. An illustration of the situation can be
seen in Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.8: Multiple-threat encounter illustration
3.3 Coordinated Encounters
The TCAS-equipped aircraft’s transponder periodically broadcasts identification and
information on whether TCAS is operational or not. Thanks to that, TCAS is aware which
of the nearby aircraft are equipped and capable of coordination. When two aircraft equipped
with TCAS are in a risk of collision, they communicate in order to choose complementary
RA senses.
Usually, one of the aircraft’s TCAS issues an RA earlier, and then it selects an RA
sense as it would normally do. Then, using a Mode-S transponder, it sends the intent to the
second aircraft. When the second aircraft issues an RA, it will use the stored intent from the
first aircraft to choose a complementary RA sense. An option of a one-time RA reversal was
added to coordinated encounters in newer versions of TCAS II for the cases where one of the
pilots does not comply with the TCAS instructions.
In the case where both aircraft would select a non-complementary RA sense at once
and send it to each other, the aircraft with a lesser ICAO identification code has priority
in choosing the sense, and the aircraft with a bigger ICAO address will reverse their RA
according to the intent received [23]. The full coordination process is illustrated in Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.9: Diagram of coordination process between two TCAS-equipped aircraft
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Chapter 4
TCAS Analysis Methodology
In this chapter, we describe the methodology of the TCAS functionality verification
within the air traffic simulator, and we further assess its potential for UAVs. Finally, the
methods used for analysis of TCAS functionality are presented.
There has been discussion over how to use TCAS on UAVs. It had been considered to
only use TCAS in traffic advisory mode which would notify the remote pilot on the ground to
take control in the case of collision danger. For fully autonomous collision avoidance, TCAS
could always take control of the UAV in case of conflict and fly it according to the resolution
advisories until the end of the conflict. If all the data were correct and accurate, this option
would greatly benefit from the almost immediate response the processor is able to provide,
since in the case when a human pilot flies according to RAs, there are long delays of up to
several seconds every time a new RA is issued [5].
4.1 Verification Techniques Overview
The analysis of collision avoidance systems historically uses three main techniques,
which thoroughly verify its functionality from different points of view. These methods are:
(i) fault tree static analysis, (ii) dynamic simulation and (iii) performance analysis using
actual flight testing [5]. The focus of this thesis is on the method of computational dynamic
simulation, but first, we shall briefly explain fault tree analysis and the flight testing methods.
Fault tree analysis is a top-down method in which we define the undesirable state, and
then we recursively search for a combination or a series of lower-level events that can lead
to such a state. In the end, this approach yields a good apprehension of what the potential
scenarios in which the system failure could occur are. For the analysis of the collision avoidance
system, the undesirable state is defined as a collision or a loss of certain limits of separation.
Flight testing is used to confirm that the computational simulation of the encounters
actually resembles real encounter trajectories and behaviour of the collision avoidance logic.
Usually, a set of encounters covering the unique situations is specified, performed and com-
pared with the prior simulated encounter trajectories.
4.2 Computational Simulation Analysis
The method of dynamic simulation needs a collision avoidance logic model, a parametrised
encounter model, an aircraft dynamics model, a pilot response model and a suitable computa-
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tional air traffic model. These models are then used to simulate aircraft encounters, capturing
features of TCAS performance. The results of the simulation are then processed statistically
to find potential causes of system failures. For that, we also need to specify the defining
parameters of the encounters forming encounter models.
4.2.1 Collision Avoidance Logic Model
We aim to implement a fully autonomous model of collision avoidance logic. In the case
of a conflict, the parametrised model of the pilot would fly according to the instructions based
on the RAs. These RAs would be issued by the implementation of the TCAS logic. The pilot
model should include parameters defining the way the pilot responds to the RAs. This way,
we can simulate the same encounter scenarios for different pilot response delays to see how
TCAS functionality would change if an autopilot with much faster reactions than a human
pilot responds to RAs.
In Chapter 5, we describe how we proceeded to implement and verify the TCAS collision
avoidance logic required for our simulation.
4.2.2 TCAS Functionality Metrics
The most commonly used metric to statistically describe the functionality of the collision
avoidance system is called the ”risk ratio”. The risk ratio is defined as follows:
Risk Ratio ≡ the probability of a near mid-air collision with operational TCAS
the probability of a near mid-air collision without TCAS interventions
(4.1)
A near mid-air collision (NMAC) is usually defined as a loss of a 100 feet separation in the
vertical sense and a 500 feet separation in the horizontal sense simultaneously. The safety
analysis of TCAS simulates generated or elsewise obtained encounter models and compares
the number of NMACs when simulated with TCAS on and otherwise [12, 13].
Another useful metric introduced by Griffith in [13] is the change in vertical miss dis-
tance (VMD), where VMD is defined as the vertical separation at CPA. To obtain the metric,
we must simulate the same scenario in two versions, one with operational TCAS and the
second without. We record the VMDs in both scenarios and then calculate the metric by sub-
tracting the second scenario VMD from the first scenario VMD. This metric directly pictures
how TCAS impacts the vertical separation by issuing RAs. In our simulation in chapters 6-7,
we mostly focus on encounters where the VMD is near zero in the version without opera-
tional TCAS. Then, the VMD in the encounter with active TCAS directly characterises the
effectivity of the collision avoidance system.
4.2.3 Encounter Modelling
It is important for the dynamic simulation to somehow obtain a large amount of en-
counters that would accurately resemble real airborne encounters that TCAS is expected
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to deal with effectively. Past analyses done by Lincoln Laboratory used aircraft encounter
records collected from radar sites to obtain a probabilistic model of encounters, which would
resemble the actual situations TCAS-equipped aircraft are likely to encounter in real airspace.
Possible model variables are vertical rates, true airspeed or the altitude level of each aircraft
in the encounter. Since there are simply not enough recorded NMACs or MACs for the pur-
poses of the collision avoidance simulation, it is necessary to generate a larger amount of
suitable encounters. The Monte Carlo technique can be used to produce initial conditions
defining the encounters using the probabilistic model[12, 13, 5]. The Monte Carlo technique is
a stochastic method which repeatedly samples variables taking their probability distribution
into account. It is typically used to produce millions of encounters that are then used to verify
the robustness of the collision avoidance system [12].
The problem with the lack of data needed to produce a fully specified probability
model arises when modelling multiple-threat encounters. With the addition of each threat,
the number of variables defining a single encounter rises. That causes the number of potential
variable combinations to rise exponentially, creating the need for a huge amount of data to
correctly assume the probability distributions of all parameters. There is also not as much
data available about observed multiple-threat encounters as they are rarer than single-threat
encounters. That renders the original approach incapable of creating a proper model. Griffith
in [13] deals with this problem by creating multiple-threat encounters by starting with the
single-threat encounter generation and then using a modified single encounter generation to
add another threat correlated to the first aircraft.
The analyses done by Lincoln Laboratory focused on generating encounters based on
the encounters recorded by radar sites [12, 13]. In this work, we choose a different perspective.
As mentioned in the introduction, we are interested in using a general parametrised encounter
simulation to find specific boundaries where TCAS logic starts losing the ability to ensure
separation. Recorded encounters cannot reflect the increasing air traffic density which causes
new types of encounters. For example, encounters involving more than one threat are already
more common than it was originally expected [13].
Encounter simulation should include parameters defining initial rates of climb/descent
(ROCD), true airspeeds (TAS), altitude levels of all participators, angles under which aircraft
approach the CPA and the distance between the separate CPA in case of a multiple-threat
encounter.
The encounter definition used in this thesis for simulation is introduced further in
Chapter 6.1.
4.2.4 Aircraft Dynamics Models
In the Lincoln Laboratory’s past analyses the aircraft motion was modelled using point-
mass dynamics with 4 or 6 degrees of freedom taking into account acceleration constraints
and response characteristics [12].
Instead of using the point-mass aircraft dynamics model, we use the Base of Aircraft
Data (BADA) Aircraft Performance Model (APM) developed and maintained by EURO-
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CONTROL [8]. BADA APM is designed to help researchers simulate and predict aircraft
trajectories. BADA includes model specifications containing equations describing relations
between aircraft performance parameters, and datasets containing a number of coefficients
for each aircraft model necessary for calculations of performance parameters.
The main parts of the performance model are the atmosphere model and the Total-
Energy Model (TEM). The atmosphere model defines how atmospheric properties like pres-
sure, temperature and density can be expressed as functions of altitude. The atmospheric
properties are essential for aircraft performance and movement calculations [18].
The TEM uses an equation to describe that the change in potential and kinetic energy
is equal to the rate of work done by forces impacting the aircraft. For the exact equations see
document [18].
The TEM equation has three input variables: true airspeed, ROCD and thrust. Two of
these variables can be chosen, and the third is obtained using the BADA equations. TCAS
II is a system relying solely on vertical manoeuvres, so we will need to control the ROCD
variable. Since TCAS does not have any logic dealing with horizontal acceleration, we fix
the true airspeed on the initial value defined by the encounter parameter. When using this
aircraft dynamics model for a specific aircraft, a problem can arise: the thrust for given values
of ROCD and TAS exceeds the maximum/minimum thrust of the aircraft. In this case, the
aircraft cannot comply with the given ROCD and TAS. The highest/lowest possible ROCD
is set instead.
The specific aircraft model is defined using eight parameter categories. These categories
are:
• Aircraft type — contains parameters such as the number of engines, engine type, the
wake category
• Mass — defines the minimum, maximum mass, and maximum payload mass
• Flight envelope — characterises the minimum speed, maximum speed, and maximum
altitude of the aircraft
• Aerodynamics — includes parameters characterising the aerodynamic drag
• Engine thrust — contains coefficients needed for the calculation of the maximum climb,
descent, cruise and take-off thrust levels
• Reduced power climb — allows the simulation of climbs using a reduced climb setting
giving a realistic profile
• Fuel consumption — contains parameters describing the fuel flow for the climb, descend
and cruise flight phases
• Ground movement — aircraft wingspan, aircraft length, take-off and landing length
with specific conditions1
1”with maximum take-off/landing weight on a hard, dry level runway under International Standard Atmo-
sphere conditions and no wind” [18]
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In total, these categories contain 50 different coefficients which describe the specific
aircraft model. In BADA version 3.8, there are over 300 available aircraft models [18].
4.2.5 Pilot Response Model
One of our goals is to use the parametrised pilot response model to inspect how delays
in the response to the RA issuance affect the RA logic’s capability of conflict resolution. For
this purpose, we define the pilot response using the three following independent parameters:
• initial response delay rdinit2 [s]
• consequent response delay rdcons3 [s]
• RA response age raage [s]
rdinit defines how long it takes the pilot to take action after the first RA was issued. rdcons
defines how long after the previous action, the pilot is able to adjust the maneuvre according
to possible consequent RAs. When the pilot takes action according to an RA, he does it
according to the most recent RA issued. This RA contains information that is at least as
old as specified by the raage parameter. For example, for an rdinit of 5 seconds and an raage
of 1 second, after the initial RA issuance it will take the pilot 5 seconds to take action, but
during those 5 seconds there will be 5 new position updates 4 which could possibly cause
modifications to the original RA. The pilot model will react to the RA that is most recent out
of the RAs that are at least 1 second old (the value of raage). The rdinit and rdcons parameters
aim to characterize the delay in the reaction of the pilot after the alerts are issued. The raage
parameter reflects the small but inevitable computational delay and data transmission delay
which make it impossible for the pilot to react to the actual most recent data update.
4.2.6 Air Traffic Model
Modelling of the air traffic is provided by the AgentFly simulation system and it is
further described in Chapter 7 which focuses on integrating the collision avoidance logic and
the pilot response model within the air traffic simulation system.
2the default value is 5 seconds as the TCAS logic assumes it takes 5 seconds for the pilot to react to an
initial RA [23]
3the default value is 2.5 seconds as the TCAS logic assumes it takes 2.5 seconds for the pilot to react to
the subsequent RAs [23]
4for the common Mode S transponders the data updates occur once per second as described in Chapter 2
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Chapter 5
TCAS Mechanism Implementation
Our goal is to implement a collision avoidance logic model based on TCAS which in the
case of loss of separation would advise a vertical manoeuvre in the form of an RA. These RAs
would then be processed by the pilot response model. In the next paragraph, our approach
to implementing and verifying the collision avoidance logic model is introduced.
First, we implemented the TCAS advisory detection logic. To verify the functionality of
the implementation, we visualise the protected volume surrounding the ownship. For different
input parameters, we confirmed that the plotted area corresponds with the TCAS logic defini-
tion. The next part of the TCAS logic that needs to be implemented is the RA type, sense and
ROCD selection. Similarly to the previous case, we want to visualise the results of the logic for
ranges of the input parameters and compare them with the TCAS logic definition. Using the
advisory detection logic and RA type, sense and ROCD selection implementation, we have
built a system responding to position updates with RAs in the case of loss of separation. We
have verified this RA logic model in a simple simulation using a point mass model of aircraft
dynamics to see if the issued RAs provide vertical separation corresponding to the current
ALIM and particular situation (Chapter 6). Furthermore, the collision avoidance logic model
was connected to the pilot model, and to a more precise aircraft dynamics model (described
in Section 4.2.4) and was used in a parametrised simulation of encounters (Chapter 7).
5.1 Advisory Detection Logic
This section focuses on the implementation of the logic which decides whether an advi-
sory should or should not be issued. After receiving a position update, TCAS separately tests
each of the nearby aircraft for the issuance of an advisory. In Figure 5.1 a diagram of the
advisory detection logic can be seen. The inputs are the single aircraft’s position update, the
ownship’s position update and the advisory type. At first, the relative position and velocity
are derived from the ownship’s and the potential threat’s position update. Depending on the
ownship’s altitude and the advisory type (TA/RA), a currently active set of thresholds is
selected. Thresholds that are important for the advisory issuance test are DMOD, ZTHR and
TAU.
Three different functions as introduced by Mun˜oz et al. in [15] are applied to the data:
1. Horizontal Check1,
1Reffered to as Horizontal RAl in [15]
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Figure 5.1: Advisory issuance logic diagram
2. Vertical Check2,
3. Collision Detection 2D algorithm
The arguments of the Horizontal Check function are the relative horizontal position,
velocity and the thresholds DMOD and TAU. The Vertical Check function similarly takes
relative altitude, vertical velocity and the ZTHR and TAU thresholds. The CD2D function’s
inputs are the relative horizontal position, velocity and the DMOD threshold. If all three
functions decide that the tested aircraft is a threat, TCAS will address the situation by
issuing a corresponding advisory.
2Reffered to as V ertical RAl in [15]
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5.1.1 Verification
For the sake of simplicity, the ownship’s altitude is set to the same altitude of 1500 feet
in all scenarios. According to Table 3.1 the altitude corresponds to the 3rd sensitivity level.
Values of DMOD, ZTHR and TAU are 0.2 NM, 600 feet and 15 seconds, respectively. The
ownship’s horizontal position is set to the coordinates (0,0). The intruder’s heading is in the
direction of the X-axis and the ownship’s heading is in the opposite direction3.
To verify the functionality of the RA detection logic, we use the following test scenarios:
Scenario 1 — An analysis of the simplest situation where the relative velocity vector is a
zero vector. Since the intruder is not getting any closer in this scenario, an RA should
be issued only if the intruder is within the protected volume defined only by the DMOD
and ZTHR thresholds. The RA detection area is depicted in Figure 5.2.
Scenario 2 — The relative velocity is set to 120 knots which is a relatively small amount
(approximately 60 m/s). The protected area around the ownship is captured in Fig-
ure 5.3.
Scenario 3 — The relative velocity is raised to 390 knots (approximately 200 m/s), and the
relative ROCD is set to -3000 feet/min. The area where our implementation of the logic
detected an RA is depicted in Figure 5.4.
Horizontal limits
In Figure 5.2a we can see a horizontal projection of the area where the logic calls for
RA issuance in Scenario 1. The shape of the horizontal projection forms a full circle around
the ownship’s position (0,0) with a radius corresponding to DMOD (0.2NM). As expected
in this simple case, the RA is issued only when the intruder is within the DMOD horizontal
distance.
If we look at the horizontal projection in Figure 5.3a, we can see that compared to the
shape of the original area from Scenario 1, it is stretched in the negative X-axis direction in this
case. This is caused by the relative velocity vector pointing exactly in the opposite direction.
We can see that the width of the area is limited by the DMOD distance. The data cursor in
Figure 5.3b shows that the RA is issued up to a distance of 0.55 NM in the negative X-axis
direction. This is 2.5 times more than the DMOD threshold. This distance should provide a
bit more than the TAU amount of seconds before a critical loss of separation as explained in
Section 3.1.2. If we divide the distance by the velocity to calculate the approximate time to
the CPA, we obtain 16.5 seconds. That confirms that the RAs issued after an intruder enters
the protected zone are providing at least the TAU amount of time before reaching the CPA.
Similarly in the final case, in Figure 5.4a, we can see that the horizontal projection
stretches even further against the direction of the relative velocity. The area is approximately
3meaning the intruder at the coordinates (-1,0) would be heading towards the ownship, the intruder at the
coordinates (1,0) has already passed the ownship
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(a) Top view
(b) Side view
Figure 5.2: RA detection visualisation for zero relative velocity vector in Scenario 1
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(a) Top view
(b) Side view
Figure 5.3: RA detection visualisation for the relative horizontal velocity of 120 knots in
Scenario 2
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three times larger than in Scenario 2 which is caused by the approximately three times higher
relative velocity. In Figure 5.4b we have a data cursor showing us that the furthest distance
in the negative X-axis direction where the RA is issued is -1.64 NM. If we calculate the time
to the CPA as we did in the previous example, we obtain 15.2 seconds. Again, this value
is higher than the TAU threshold, meaning the area is wide enough to provide the desired
amount of time for the reaction. If we compare this value with the one that we obtained in
Scenario 2, we can see that it is much closer to the TAU threshold. This is in accordance with
the characteristic attributes of τmod. The τmod converges in the time to the CPA with the rise
of the closure rate as described in Section 3.1.2.
Vertical Limits
Figure 5.2b shows a side view of the protected area in Scenario 1. The area is sym-
metrical, rising from 900 feet to 2100 feet as we can see from the data cursors. It extends
exactly 600 feet above and below the ownship’s position (1500 feet) as expected since the
ZTHR threshold is 600 feet.
In Figure 5.3b, the height of the protected area remained the same as in Scenario 1
because there is no change of the vertical velocity or the sensitivity level.
In Figure 5.4b the data cursors capture the vertical boundaries of the RA issuance
area. We can see that the lower boundary remains the same as in the other two scenarios
(900 feet). The upper boundary is now 2250 feet instead of the 2100 feet previously forced
by the ZTHR threshold. Because of the high ROCD (-3000 feet/min), in 15 seconds (TAU
value) the relative vertical distance between the ownship and the intruder will decrease by
750 feet (if the ownship is below the intruder). An initial RA should provide at least the TAU
amount of time before the collision, meaning the upper boundary of the protected area should
be 750 feet above the ownship’s position which corresponds to the 2250 feet upper boundary
depicted in Figure 5.4b. From that, we can see that the vertical boundaries of the protected
area change only for high relative ROCDs.
5.2 RA Type Selection
This section focuses on the implementation of the logic which decides what type of RA
should be issued. After the TCAS logic detects an RA, it needs to decide whether the RA
is preventive or corrective. For a diagram of the RA type selection logic, see Figure 5.5. The
RA type selection logic receives information about the relative position and velocity of the
ownship and the intruders. Based on this data, it calculates the τmod to predict when the
CPA will occur. It then extrapolates the trajectories of both the ownship and the intruder to
the predicted CPA. Finally, the logic compares the predicted vertical separation at the CPA
with the ALIM threshold for the given sensitivity level. If the vertical separation is higher
than ALIM, no manoeuvre is required, and the RA is preventive. In that case, the aircraft are
expected to miss each other with sufficient vertical separation. Otherwise, the RA is corrective
and TCAS will recommend a resolving vertical manoeuvre to the pilot.
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(a) Top view
(b) Side view
Figure 5.4: RA detection visualisation for the relative horizontal velocity of 390 knots and
the relative ROCD of -3000 feet/min in Scenario 3
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Figure 5.5: RA type selection logic diagram
5.2.1 Verification
To verify the functionality of the RA type selection logic, we use the same approach
as in Section 5.1.1. Once again, we fix the ownship’s position vector and the relative velocity
vector between the aircraft, so we can iterate over the intruder’s position and visualise how
the response changes. The ownship’s horizontal position is set to the coordinates (0,0) and
its altitude at 1500 feet in all scenarios.
We use the following three test scenarios:
Scenario 1 — A simple case where the relative ROCD is set to 0 feet/min. The relative
velocity is fixed to 195 knots (100 m/s). This situation can be seen in Figure 5.6.
Scenario 2 — The relative ROCD to 1000 feet/min. We leave all other parameters the same.
This situation is visualised in Figure 5.7.
Scenario 3 — The relative ROCD is changed to -3000 feet/min to see how the logic works
when the ROCD is high while the horizontal velocity is relatively low. This is pictured
in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.6: RA type selection visualisation for the relative horizontal velocity of 195 knots
Figure 5.7: RA type selection visualisation for the relative horizontal velocity of 195 knots
and the ROCD of 1000 feet/min
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Figure 5.8: RA type selection visualisation for the relative horizontal velocity of 195 knots
and the relative ROCD of -3000 feet/min
In Figure 5.6, we can see that the area where a corrective RA is issued is in the centre
of the RA detection region and that it is horizontally aligned. As explained above, a correc-
tive RA is issued only if the vertical separation at the CPA is predicted to be lower than the
ALIM threshold. Because the relative ROCD is 0 in this scenario, the vertical separation stays
the same during this encounter. This results in issuing corrective RAs only if the intruder’s
position is vertically closer than the ALIM. According to Table 3.1 the ALIM for this sensi-
tivity level is 300 feet. Then, since the ownship’s altitude is 1500 feet, the upper boundary
for issuing a corrective RA is expected to be 1800 feet, and the lower boundary is expected
to be 1200 feet. The plot in Figure 5.6 confirms that the boundaries are as expected.
When there is a non-zero relative ROCD, there are two areas where the logic behaves
differently as depicted in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8. The first area is very close to the ownship’s
horizontal position (more accurately within the DMOD boundaries). Here, the corrective RAs
are issued only if the intruder is within ALIM boundaries of vertical separation. The second
area is further away from the ownship’s horizontal position. In contrast to the first area, the
corrective RA issuance area slopes up or down corresponding to the relative ROCD value in
this case. This is caused by using the concept of τmod which is defined to approximate the
time to enter the DMOD wide critical zone around the ownship. When the intruder is already
inside the critical zone, τmod is at a constant minimum value of 0 seconds[14]. This causes the
discrepancy between the area outside and inside the DMOD boundary.
The slope in Figure 5.7 is marked by two data cursors. For the given ROCD and relative
velocity, we can calculate that it takes the same amount of time to travel the horizontal
distance between the data cursors as it takes to travel the vertical distance between the data
cursors. This confirms that the slope is copying the relative horizontal/vertical velocity ratio.
Thus, the area where a corrective RA is issued is basically the area where the intruders
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are pointed towards the critical zone4 around the ownship’s position. If the intruders are not
within this area, they are predicted to miss the ownship with sufficient vertical separation and
a preventive RA is the correct way to address them. In the case where an intruder appears in
the DMOD wide zone around the ownship, a corrective RA is issued only if the current vertical
separation is lower than the current ALIM value. From the shape of the areas in Figure 5.7
and Figure 5.8, we can see that it is constructed so that the logic issues a corrective RA in
advance in the case where the intruder is heading towards the critical area.
5.3 RA Sense and ROCD Selection
This section focuses on the implementation of the logic which decides what manoeuvre
will be recommended to the pilot. A diagram of the logic can be seen in Figure 5.9.
When a corrective RA has been detected, it is necessary to choose the best vertical
manoeuvre to preserve the vertical separation. We iteratively test if the currently inspected
manoeuvre is a valid resolution of the conflict. For this purpose, a vertical manoeuvre is
defined by the change of the ROCD (further referred to as ∆ ROCD) and the RA sense.
The optimal manoeuvre causes the smallest possible deviation from the original flight path
while maintaining the level of protection. ∆ ROCD is set to the lowest value and iteratively
increases it when the manoeuvre does not provide the desired level of protection defined by
the ALIM threshold of the vertical separation.
Before the iterative testing of the manoeuvres, the data from the latest position update
is used to calculate the τmod for each intruder. These values are then used in every iteration to
define the set of CPAs which are critical points in time where we need to provide a sufficient
vertical separation.
The manoeuvre validity test first checks the feasibility of the manoeuvres. If it holds
that
(the current ownship’s ROCD) + ∆ROCD > ROCDMAX (5.1)
and (the current ownship’s ROCD)−∆ROCD < ROCDMIN (5.2)
then there is no feasible manoeuvre that would provide ALIM at all CPAs. In such a case,
safety is the priority and the manoeuvre providing the highest vertical separation at CPAs is
chosen. This can happen in a particularly difficult multiple-threat encounter.
5.3.1 Verification
To verify the RA sense selection logic, we again iterate over the intruder’s position while
the relative horizontal velocity, ROCD and ownship’s position remain fixed. The ownship’s
position and therefore the sensitivity level remains the same as in the previous examples.
This time, we focus on visualising the RA sense selection logic to inspect the preference in
4DMOD wide and ALIM high zone
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Figure 5.9: RA ROCD and sense selection logic diagram
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manoeuvres. The approach we choose in this section enables us to observe the behaviour of
the logic only in a single-threat encounter. Multiple-threat encounters are analysed in Section
6.4.
The following scenarios are used to show the RA sense selection functionality:
Scenario 1 — A simple case where the relative ROCD is set to zero, and horizontal velocity
is set to 195 knots. The graph of this scenario can be seen in Figure 5.10.
Scenario 2 — The intruder’s ROCD is raised to -3000 feet/min, while the ownship’s ROCD
remains at 0 feet/min. All the other parameters remain the same as in the previous
scenario. The resulting RA sense selection graph is depicted in Figure 5.11.
Scenario 3 — The ownship’s ROCD is set to 4300 feet/min which is almost the maximum
value. The intruder’s ROCD is set to 1300 feet/min, which causes the relative ROCD to
be the same as in Scenario 2. The horizontal velocity remains at the value of 195 knots.
The visualisation of the RA sense logic for this scenario is depicted in Figure 5.12
Figure 5.10: RA sense selection visualisation for the relative horizontal velocity of 195 knots
In Scenario 1, the relative ROCD is set to zero, and an RA sense is selected simply
based on the relative altitude. While reacting to a threat which is below the ownship’s position
(1500 feet), corrective advisories prefer the upward RA sense since it is more likely to provide
the sufficient vertical separation and also it is a non-altitude crossing sense. Similarly, the
downward RA sense is selected when the intruder is above the ownship.
During the RA sense selection a very high/low value of the ownship’s ROCD can cause
the otherwise optimal upward/downward sense to not be selected because of the upper/lower
limit for the ROCD. Otherwise, the absolute ROCD of the ownship does not affect the deci-
sions made by the RA sense selection logic. In Scenario 2, the corrective RA area is divided
by a line reaching towards the ownship’s position with a slope corresponding to the ratio
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Figure 5.11: RA sense selection visualisation for the relative horizontal velocity of 390 knots
and the relative ROCD of 3000 feet/min
Figure 5.12: RA sense selection visualisation for the relative ROCD of 3000 feet/min and
ownship’s ROCD of 4300
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between the relative horizontal velocity and ROCD. Then, the upward RA sense is picked if
the intruder’s position at the CPA is expected to be below the ownship. In Scenario 3, the
upward RA sense area is smaller than in Scenario 2. This is caused by the maximum ROCD
limit which is 4400 feet/min as shown in Table 3.2. This causes the upward RA sense to be
invalid for a higher ∆ ROCD as the final ROCD cannot go over the limit. As a result, for
certain positions, the downward RA sense is selected with a higher ∆ ROCD than in the case
where the ownship’s velocity is not near the limit.
5.4 Composition of the TCAS Logic
This section describes how the previously introduced parts of the RA logic work to-
gether. The functionality is depicted in Figure 5.13. When a new position update arrives, it is
first sent to the RA detection logic. If a threat is detected within the protected area, the RA
is issued. Otherwise, the default flight path is kept without any constraints. In the case where
an RA is issued, its type is selected. In the case of preventive RAs, changes to the current
ROCD are restricted. In the case of corrective RAs, it is required to specify a manoeuvre
which will resolve the situation.
Figure 5.13: Diagram of the RA logic composition
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The verification of the whole RA logic is the focus of Chapter 6 where a discrete en-
counter simulation is used for this purpose. The RA logic is then further used in Chapter 7
where it is integrated within the air traffic simulation and used for precise encounter simula-
tion.
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Chapter 6
Discrete Encounter Simulation
We use a simple discrete encounter simulation to inspect how the composition of the RA
logic works. The goal of this chapter is to verify the functionality of the RA logic in various
scenarios. The discrete encounter simulation addresses single and multiple-threat encounters
together with unpredictable manoeuvres performed by the intruders. Coordinated encounters
are not to be tested using this simulation as it lacks a model of aircraft communication. The
coordinated encounters simulation is included in Chapter 7.
This simulation uses a point-mass model of aircraft and takes the maximum and mini-
mum ROCD constraints into account. The ownship’s initial manoeuvres are simulated with an
acceleration of 0.25 g which is in accordance with what the TCAS logic assumptions described
in Section 3.2.
6.1 Encounter Definition
This section introduces and explains the encounter parametrisation. This parametrisa-
tion is then used both in the discrete encounter simulation (Chapter 6) and in the air traffic
simulation (Chapter 7) for the purpose of verifying and analysing the collision avoidance
system. Figure 6.1 illustrates the encounter parametrisation.
Each aircraft in the encounter can be characterised by four parameters:
• Initial horizontal position vector ~p [NM]
• Initial altitude h [feet]
• Initial horizontal velocity vector ~v [m/s]
• Initial ROCD dh [feet/min]
This parametrisation suits the stochastic encounter simulation but it is impractical for
our simulation. As explained in Section 4.2.3, our focus is to analyse the impact of specific
input parameters on the simulation and find specific boundaries of the TCAS functionality.
For that, we need a parametrisation that would allow us to change the parameters of interest,
and see their sole impact on the encounter resolution.
The modification of a single parameter causes the prior vertical separation (the word
prior is used to refer to what the trajectories of the encounter would look like without the
interventions by the collision avoidance system) to change. Since the prior vertical separation
characterises the ”difficulty” of the encounter, we cannot iterate over a single parameter of
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(a) Top view
(b) Side View
Figure 6.1: Illustration of the simulation parameters
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the simulation to see how it affects the collision avoidance system’s functionality. To observe
how the change of the aircraft’s initial horizontal velocity and ROCD affects the encounter
resolution, we need to keep the prior vertical separation constant. This can be done using the
following encounter definition.
The horizontal position of the CPA is fixed (~pCPA = (0, 0)), as it does not affect the
collision avoidance logic in any way, while the other parameters are iteratively changed. The
altitude of the CPA, hCPA , is a parameter used to change the sensitivity level. Parameter α
specifies the angle of approach, it allows us to have the absolute horizontal velocity, v ≡ |~v| ,
as a parameter instead of ~v. The last parameter we need to define is, tCPA, the time it takes
the aircraft to reach the CPA from the beginning of the simulation. The value of tCPA has to
be high enough so that the aircraft in the simulation do not begin in the RA detection region.
If this condition is fulfilled, the value of tCPA does not affect the encounter and can be derived
from the input velocities and TAU, DMOD and ZTHR values of the current sensitivity level.
The parameters characterising the aircraft in the encounter can be then estimated as follows:
~v = (v cosα, v sinα), (6.1)
~p = ~pCPA − tCPA~v, (6.2)
h = hCPA − tCPAdh, (6.3)
dh remains as an input parameter, and the ownship’s horizontal velocity is defined as ~vownship =
(vownship, 0).
In a multiple-threat encounter, we define the consequent CPAs using the time it will
take the ownship to reach them after the first CPA, then we can define additional intruders
the same way that the intruder in the single-threat encounter is defined.
If we add the parameters of the pilot response model (described in Section 4.2.5) and a
necessary parameter defining if the particular intruder is equipped with an operating TCAS
or not, we reach the following final set of input parameters for the simulation:
• Pilot response model parameters1
– Initial pilot response delay rdinit [s]
– Consequent pilot response delay rdcons [s]
– RA response age raage [s]
• Ownship’s
– initial (absolute) horizontal velocity v [m/s]
– initial ROCD dh [feet/min]
– desired sensitivity level sl [-] (from which the ownship’s altitude at the first CPA
is derived)
• Each Intruder’s
– is TCAS active? [-]
1the pilot response model is utilised in Chapter 7 for the simulation of reaction delays
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– time delay from the first CPA tdCPA
2[s]
– initial horizontal velocity v [m/s]
– initial ROCD dh[feet/min]
– approach angle α [°]
– (optional) prior altitude offset at the CPA [feet]
– (optional) prior horizontal offset at the CPA [NM]
Using the proposed parametrisation of the encounter, we can easily iterate over a single
parameter and see its influence on the resulting characteristics. The purpose of the TCAS
logic is to provide sufficient vertical separation at the CPA. The output characteristic of the
encounter that characterises the collision avoidance system’s performance the most is the
vertical separation at the CPA3. To characterise the system’s promptness to respond to the
intruder’s approach, the ”reaction time” which captures how many seconds before reaching
the CPA the ownship started manoeuvring is used.
6.2 Single-threat Encounters
When simulating the encounters, we want to observe the manoeuvre recommended by
the collision avoidance logic and the resulting VMD at the CPA. So, to compare the collision
avoidance logic reactions to different encounters, we plot the trajectories of the aircraft in the
encounters in a 3-D graph and highlight the CPA and the corresponding vertical separation.
In the following encounter scenarios, the CPA is placed at the coordinates: (0,0) and at
FL 150. For the corresponding sensitivity level, the value of ALIM is 400 feet, and the TAU
threshold is set to 30 seconds (for the complete list of thresholds see Table 3.1). The angle α
is set to 180°. The tCPA is 40 seconds to provide a reasonable amount of time before reaching
the RA detection region and the prior horizontal and vertical distance at the CPA is fixed
to zero. The end of the simulation is set to be 5 seconds after the aircraft reach the planned
CPA.
To test the collision avoidance system functionality, we inspect 4 scenarios with different
initial ownship’s and intruder’s ROCDs and horizontal velocities. The sets of parameters
defining the scenarios are filed in Table 6.1. Trajectories of the encounters are visualised in
figures 6.2-6.5 for scenarios 1-4, respectively. The resulting VMD in each scenario can be
derived from the data cursors which are highlighting the CPA.
In Scenario 1, the VMD is slightly higher than the ALIM threshold. With the rise of
the relative ROCD in the two next scenarios, the VMD rises too. It may appear that the
collision avoidance system is causing unnecessary deviations. This is because it protects a
critical DMOD wide area around the ownship, and not just the point in the space where the
aircraft is predicted to be as explained in Section 3.1.2. In Scenario 3, this leads to a very high
VMD (1070 feet) at the CPA because of the extremely high relative ROCD (6000 feet/min)
combined with the high DMOD value (0.8 NM).
2used in the multiple-threat encounters
3also referred to as the VMD (Vertical Miss Distance)
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Table 6.1: Single-threat encounters — Scenario specific parameters
Parameter values
Scenario number 1 2 3 4
Ownship
Horizontal velocity [m/s] 100 100 100 150
ROCD [feet/min] 0 -3000 -3000 -3000
Intruder
Horizontal Velocity [m/s] 100 100 100 150
ROCD [feet/min] 0 0 3000 3000
Figure 6.2: Encounter simulation of single-threat encounter – Scenario 1
Figure 6.3: Encounter simulation of single-threat encounter – Scenario 2
42
CHAPTER 6. DISCRETE ENCOUNTER SIMULATION
Figure 6.4: Encounter simulation of single-threat encounter – Scenario 3
Since at least the ALIM vertical separation should be provided upon entering the critical
area, the vertical separation at the actual CPA will be higher, especially if the relative ROCD
is high. If we raise the horizontal closure rate to 300 m/s (see Figure 6.5), the time interval
during which the intruder is passing through the critical zone shortens. That enables the
collision avoidance system to make a weaker manoeuvre while still providing the ALIM vertical
separation throughout the whole critical zone. As we can see in Figure 6.5, this resulted in
the VMD of 550 feet and also in using the opposite RA sense which is preferable. This RA
sense was not available in the previous case because even the manoeuvre using the minimum
value of the ROCD was not strong enough to provide the ALIM separation throughout the
whole critical zone.
Figure 6.5: Encounter simulation of single-threat encounter – Scenario 4
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6.3 Reaction to Intruder’s Manoeuvres
Next, we test how the collision avoidance logic reacts to possible sudden changes in the
intruder’s velocity. We use the previously introduced encounter depicted in Figure 6.2, and
add a sudden manoeuvre performed by the intruder. Figure 6.6 shows the resulting collision
avoidance manoeuvres. The intruder accelerates to 2000 feet/min just 10 seconds before
Figure 6.6: Trajectory simulation - intruder accelerates to 2000 feet/min 10 seconds prior to
the CPA
Figure 6.7: Trajectory simulation - intruder accelerates to 4000 feet/min 10 seconds prior to
the CPA
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reaching the CPA. The ownship reacts by a subsequent RA to increase the ROCD almost
to the maximum. The resulting VMD is 540 feet which confirms that the collision avoidance
system was able to react to such a situation, mainly thanks to there being no delays in
response to the subsequent RA issuance.
Figure 6.7 depicts a similar encounter where the intruder accelerates to 4000 feet/min,
making it more difficult for the ownship to avoid the loss of separation. The VMD is 360
feet which is below the ALIM threshold. In the cases where no RA can provide at least the
ALIM separation, the RA providing the largest vertical separation is issued. The encounter
is considered to be an NMAC when the vertical separation decreases under 100 feet.
The collision avoidance logic works as expected while dealing well with the single-
threat encounters. Next, its performance in the multiple-threat encounters is tested using the
simulation.
6.4 Multiple-threat Encounters
First, we focus on how the delay between the different CPAs impacts the encounter.
We compare two cases where:
• The ownship’s CPAs with both intruders coincide (depicted in Figure 6.8a).
• The ownship’s CPAs with the second intruder is delayed by 10 seconds (depicted in
Figure 6.8b).
The fixed parameters are listed in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Values of Fixed Parameters - multiple-threat encounter
Ownship Intruder 1 Intruder 2
Approach angle α [°] – 180 180
Horizontal Velocity [m/s] 100 100 100
ROCD [feet/min] 0 0 0
Altitude Offset [feet] – -100 400
Sensitivity level 4
In the figures, we can see that in both cases the VMD is higher than the ALIM threshold
(300 feet) at both intruder’s CPAs. Different evasive manoeuvres were chosen. In the former
case, there is a considerably smaller deviation from the original flight path. Then, the resolu-
tion which was used in the first encounter would be a better solution for the second encounter
than the one that was actually used. This is due to the initial reaction beginning before the
collision avoidance system detects the second intruder. It turns out that in multiple-threat
encounters, there are phases where the logic only counts on a partial amount of the intruders
and the advisories may change when a new threat is close enough to be detected.
A similar situation occurs when a threat passes through the CPA and is no longer a
threat. The collision avoidance logic then adjusts the RA to one that resolves conflicts with
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(a) The second intruder’s CPA delay = 0s
(b) The second intruder’s CPA delay = 10s
Figure 6.8: Multiple-threat encounters - the CPA delay impact
the remaining intruders in an optimised way. An instance of such a situation can be seen in
Figure 6.9. The parameters defining the encounter are listed in Table 6.3. The evasive ma-
noeuvre was successful as the VMD with both intruders is slightly above the ALIM threshold
(300 feet).
Finally, we want to inspect how the collision avoidance logic’s decisions change based
on manipulation of the encounter parameters. We adjust the parameters to create encounters
where the collision avoidance logic is forced to seek different solutions. We aim to confirm
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Table 6.3: Values of Fixed Parameters - multiple-threat encoumnter with RA reversal
Ownship Intruder 1 Intruder 2
Approach angle α [°] – 180 180
Horizontal Velocity [m/s] 75 75 75
ROCD [feet/min] 0 0 -1000
Time Delay of CPA [s] – 0 10
Altitude Offset [feet] – 0 760
Sensitivity level 4
Figure 6.9: Trajectory simulation - multiple-threat encounter with an RA sense reversal case
that the collision avoidance logic is able to deal with a difficult encounter where the ALIM
vertical separation cannot be kept, and the logic then has to choose a manoeuvre which keeps
the vertical separation as large as possible. The parameters defining the scenarios are listed
in Table 6.4, the scenarios vary in the amount of intruders and the altitude offset of Intruder
3.
Scenario 1 — A relatively simple encounter, only intruders 1-2 are present. The simulated
trajectories are depicted in Figure 6.10.
Scenario 2 — A third intruder is added to the encounter. The altitude offset of Intruder 3
at the CPA is -400 feet, so that he collides with the evasive descent of the ownship used
in Scenario 1. This scenario is depicted in Figure 6.11
Scenario 3 — The altitude offset of Intruder 3 is changed to -700 feet to precisely block the
ownship from descending even at increased vertical rates as it did in Scenario 2. The
resulting trajectories can be seen in Figure 6.12.
If we closely inspect the CPAs between intruders 1 and 2, we conclude that there is
no possibility of flying between the first and the second intruder trajectories through the
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CPAs without losing the ALIM vertical separation while the intruders are passing through
the DMOD wide critical zone. That is because the horizontal distance between the CPAs is
approximately 0.5 NM, while the critical area is 0.7 NM long (twice as long as the DMOD
threshold), and the vertical distance between the CPAs is 520 feet which is lower than the
height of the critical area (600 feet, twice the ALIM threshold). In Scenario 1, this leads to
the RA reversal being necessary to maintain the level of protection.
Table 6.4: Values of Fixed Parameters - difficult multiple-threat encounter
Ownship Intruder 1 Intruder 2 Intruder 3
Approach angle α [°] – 180 180 180
Horizontal Velocity [m/s] 100 100 100 100
ROCD [feet/min] 0 0 -1000 1000
Time Delay of CPA [s] – 10 0 10
Altitude Offset [feet] – -100 420 variable
Sensitivity level 4
Figure 6.10: Multiple-threat encounter trajectory simulation - Scenario 1
In Scenario 2, the ownship detects the third intruder soon after the RA sense reversal.
To avoid a collision, the ownship accelerates to a stronger descent and avoids the third intruder
with a VMD of 395 feet.
In Scenario 3, the collision avoidance logic detects the third intruder after beginning
the descent and performs a second RA sense reversal to achieve the largest vertical separation
possible. It does so by climbing in-between the first and the second intruder. As discussed
above, this route cannot provide the ALIM separation in the whole DMOD wide critical area
around the ownship but it provides the largest possible vertical separation. The resulting
vertical separation at the exact CPA is 350 feet with the first intruder, and 359 feet with the
second intruder. The third intruder is almost 1000 feet below at the moment of the CPA. We
can see that the collision avoidance logic chose a manoeuvre which keeps approximately the
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same amount of vertical separation from both intruders. This approach maximizes the lowest
of the vertical separations with the separate intruders.
To conclude, the collision avoidance logic works as expected. It performs well both
in single and multiple-threat encounters. Integration with a more precise aircraft dynamics
model, air traffic encounter model and a pilot response model should enable us to analyse the
RA logic functionality accurately.
Figure 6.11: Multiple-threat encounter trajectory simulation - Scenario 2
Figure 6.12: Multiple-threat encounter trajectory simulation - Scenario 3
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Chapter 7
Collision Avoidance Logic Integration
within the Air Traffic Simulation
For the purpose of a precise parametrised encounter simulation, the collision avoid-
ance system was integrated within AgentFly air traffic simulation which was developed by
researchers at AI Center, CTU in Prague. AgentFly simulates each aircraft as an indepen-
dent autonomous entity responsible for planning its flight path and interacting with the rest
of the system [3] (for samples of the AgentFly simulation visualisation see Figure 7.1). For
our particular simulation BADA aircraft dynamics models (as described in Section 4.2.4) are
used.
7.1 Entity Structure
The TCAS2 module is introduced as the main part of the entity representing the aircraft
in our simulation of encounters. For the structure of the TCAS2 module see Figure 7.2. The
entities communicate by sending/processing events which are distributed by the Distributed
Events Manager. Entities can replan their current flight plan (e.g. upon detecting a future
collision) by sending information about the desired future trajectories to the BADA Flight
Planner in the form of clearances. A clearance mainly specifies the desired altitude at a
particular point in the horizontal trajectory plan, and also an ROCD used to reach this
altitude. The target altitude is specified in the form of FL which means that it is only possible
to set the target altitude in a resolution of hundreds of feet. The position updates arrive once
(a) Sample of AgentFly air traffic simula-
tion (borrowed from [2])
(b) An example of a multiple-threat encounter with flight
plans visualised
Figure 7.1: AgentFly simulation visualisation
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per second which corresponds to the widely used Mode S transponder technology as described
in Chapter 2.
7.1.1 TCAS2 Pilot Module
The TCAS2 module includes models for the RA logic composition, pilot response and
coordination as can be seen in Figure 7.2. When the module receives a position update, it
processes the data and sends it to the RA logic where the collision avoidance logic decides
whether a change in plan is needed or not. If the former is the case, the issued RAs are sent
to the pilot response model. The pilot response model stores past RAs, and it chooses when
and how to react to the issued RAs by forwarding the chosen manoeuvre to the pilot control
module. The manoeuvre is then converted into a suitable form of clearances for the BADA
Flight Planner. The planner integrates the new clearances to the old flight plan and replans
the future trajectories accordingly.
While active, the TCAS2 Pilot module broadcasts its identification to nearby aircraft
via events. These events are received by other active modules with a specified delay. The
active modules then keep a record of the identified active TCAS aircraft, so in the case of an
encounter, they know TCAS-TCAS coordination can be engaged. When a threat with active
TCAS is detected, the coordination process follows as explained in Section 3.3. The modules
send their intents using the events, so that they can choose the complementary RA senses.
7.2 Encounter Simulation
Using the parametrisation of the encounters (introduced in Section 6.1), we can easily
iterate over a single parameter and see its influence on the resulting characteristics. For an
illustration of the encounter parameters see Figure 6.1a and Figure 6.1b.
The BADA performance model of the ATR 721, a twin-engined regional airliner, is used
for the simulation of encounters in this chapter. The absolute horizontal velocity parameter
is replaced by the aircraft’s True Airspeed (TAS). The parameter of the ownship’s altitude at
the first CPA is derived from the desired altitude zone. It is set to the vertical centre of the
desired zone to ensure the use of the zone’s particular set of thresholds during the encounter.
For the boundaries of zones and the corresponding threshold parameters see Table 3.1.
7.2.1 Single-threat Encounters
Results for three different altitude zones are always shown in this section to provide
comparison and visualise the impact of the thresholds on various scenarios.
1listed as AT72 in the BADA performance files
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Figure 7.2: TCAS2 module structure diagram
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The Effect of the Ownship’s TAS
Figure 7.3 shows ALIM boundaries together with the resulting VMD for the range of
TAS values, while other parameters are fixed (see Table 7.1). The resulting VMD stably stays
slightly over the corresponding ALIM value except for the maximum TAS values. For those
highest values of TAS the VMD slowly decays. This is caused by the aircraft dynamics model
which has a limited maximum thrust for this given altitude.
Table 7.1: Values of Fixed Parameters - High Closure Rate impact on angle/reaction time
characteristics
Ownship Intruder 1
α [°] 0 180
TAS [m/s] variable 120
ROCD [feet/min] 800 1200
Zone variable
Pilot Response
Model Parameters
Initial Delay [s] 5.0
Consequent Delay [s] 2.5
RA age [s] 1.0
Figure 7.3: The resulting vertical separation at the CPA for different TAS values
The Effect of the Approach Angle α
Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5 depict the impact of the approach angle α on the reaction
time. The former does so for very high (horizontal) closure rates, the latter for very low
closure rates. Full lists of the other parameters of the encounters are listed in Table 7.2 and
Table 7.3, respectively. In both cases, the reaction time is higher for low values of α. This
feature is considerably more significant in the low closure rates case. This is due to the shape
of the RA detection area. For very low values of α the aircraft enter the DMOD-wide zone
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much earlier which leads to an earlier issuance of an RA followed by an earlier reaction of the
pilot model. In the high closure rates case, the reaction time for higher values of α quickly
converges to the value of ”TAU − rdinit”. In contrast to the previous case, the reaction time
in the low closure rate case is considerably higher, because the DMOD threshold is more
significant in comparison to the closure rate.
Table 7.2: Values of Fixed Parameters - high closure rate’s impact on angle/reaction time
characteristics
Ownship Intruder 1
α [°] 0 variable
TAS [m/s] 120 120
ROCD [feet/min] 800 1200
Zone variable
Pilot Response
Model Parameters
Initial Delay [s] 5.0
Consequent Delay [s] 2.5
RA age [s] 1.0
Figure 7.4: The impact of the α parameter on the reaction time for a high closure rate
Table 7.3: Values of Fixed Parameters - low closure rate’s impact on α/reaction time charac-
teristics
Ownship Intruder 1
α [°] 0 variable
TAS [m/s] 60 60
ROCD [feet/min] 800 1200
Zone variable
Pilot Response
Model Parameters
Initial Delay [s] 5.0
Consequent Delay [s] 2.5
RA age [s] 1.0
The Effect of the ROCD
Figure 7.6 shows the resulting VMD for a range of intruder’s TAS values. The VMD for
low ROCDs is slightly higher than the corresponding ALIM threshold, but it rises with the
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Figure 7.5: The impact of the α parameter on the reaction time for a low closure rate
rise of the intruder’s ROCD. As explained earlier in Section 6.2, as the relative ROCD rises,
the vertical separation at the CPA rises too. This is the result of the aircraft gaining further
vertical separation while the intruder flies through the DMOD-wide zone around the ownship.
This feature is very significant in this particular case because the closure rate is low (both
aircraft’s TAS is set to 60 m/s, there is an altitude offset of -100 to fix the upward RA sense
for better comparison, for the rest of the parameters defining the encounter see Table 7.4). In
Figure 7.6, the ROCD for Zone 5 is plotted only up to 2300 feet/min. This is due to a higher
mid-zone altitude (FL 150) than in the case of zones 3-4 (FL 38, FL75), in which such a high
ROCD is not reachable for the BADA aircraft model used (AT-72).
The VMD graphs tend to be jagged as can be seen at the beginning in Figure 7.6.
This is because, as the encounter even slightly changes it is likely to cause the system to
detect the intruder during the different position update which effectively leads to a different
manoeuvre. All manoeuvres aim to provide at the least ALIM vertical separation throughout
the DMOD-wide zone, and that can lead to quite different vertical separations at the exact
CPA, especially when the pilot reaction delays are in effect. As mentioned in Section 7.1, the
target altitude can be set with a resolution of hundreds of feet, this also causes the graphs to
be jagged as the cruise altitude is rounded to hundreds of feet.
Table 7.4: Values of Fixed Parameters - Effect of Intruder’s ROCD
Ownship Intruder 1
α [°] 0 180
TAS [m/s] 60 60
ROCD [feet/min] 0 variable
Zone variable
Altitude offset [feet] 0 -100
Pilot Response
Model Parameters
Initial Delay [s] 5.0
Consequent Delay [s] 2.5
RA age [s] 1.0
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Figure 7.6: A rising ROCD impacting the VMD
The Effect of the Initial Pilot Response Delay
The impact of the rise of the initial pilot response delay on the VMD is depicted in
Figure 7.7. Fixed parameters defining the encounter can be found in Table 7.5. TCAS assumes
that the pilot reacts to the initial RA issuance with a 5 second delay [23]. Figure 7.7 shows
that the VMD in this encounter is stable until the initial pilot response delay reaches 9 seconds
for Zone 3, and 13 seconds for zones 4 and 5. This shows that the collision avoidance system
is effective in such single-threat encounters until the delay reaches approximately twice the
assumed amount. With a further rise of the delay, the VMD declines. With a delay of up to
16 seconds, the VMD drops to 100 feet which indicates the NMAC.
Table 7.5: Values of Fixed Parameters - Initial Pilot Response Delay impact on the VMD
Ownship Intruder 1
α [°] 0 180
TAS [m/s] 110 60
ROCD [feet/min] 0 1200
Zone variable
Pilot Response
Model Parameters
Initial Delay [s] variable
Consequent Delay [s] 2.5
RA age [s] 1.0
Coordinated Encounters
In this section we test coordinated TCAS-TCAS encounters, for a description of coor-
dinated encounters see Section 3.3. To show the benefits of coordination, we reuse the two
encounters where the ALIM vertical separation was not kept in the uncoordinated encounters.
First, Figure 7.8 shows the VMD for the range of TAS values. Previously, as depicted
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Figure 7.7: The impact of the initial pilot response delay on the resulting VMD
in Figure 7.3, the ALIM separation was violated because the ownship was not capable of a
strong enough manoeuvre. In coordinated encounters, it is enough for both aircraft to perform
weaker manoeuvres in opposite directions. As a result, the ALIM separation is kept as can
be seen in Figure 7.8.
The ALIM separation was also not provided when the initial pilot response delay was
too high as depicted in Figure 7.7. Results of the coordinated encounter simulation with the
same set of parameters as in Table 7.5 are depicted in Figure 7.9. When compared with
Figure 7.7, the decay of the vertical separation comes with approximately a 2 seconds higher
value of delay than in the uncoordinated encounter case.
Figure 7.8: Coordinated version of the TAS iteration
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Figure 7.9: Coordinated version of the initial pilot response delay iteration
7.2.2 Multiple-threat Encounters
To test the effect of delays on multiple-threat encounters, we fix the ratios between pilot
response parameters and iterate over them on sample encounters. The ratio that is kept is as
follows:
rdcons =
1
2
rdinit (7.1)
raage =
1
5
rdinit (7.2)
The following test scenarios are used to show the impact the simulation parameters have on
the resulting VMD/delay characteristics:
Scenario 1 — Two intruders head from below and above to a direct collision with the ownship
as specified by the parameters in Table 7.6. The results are depicted in Figure 7.10.
Scenario 2 — This scenario shows how the altitude offset parameter can influence the en-
counter. The offsets are set so that the prior ownship’s position at the CPA is surrounded
by intruders with a vertical separation of 100 feet. The input parameters are specified
in Table 7.7, and the characteristics is depicted in Figure 7.11. We also test coordi-
nated version of this encounter where all aircraft are TCAS-equipped, this is depicted
in Figure 7.12.
Scenario 3 — This scenario, defined by the parameters in Table 7.8 and visualised in Fig-
ure 7.13, shows the effect of a time offset between the intruders’ CPAs.The intruders’
CPAs do not coincide as in previous scenarios. Intruder 1 is delayed by 5 seconds.
The VMD graphs where we iterate over the response delays tend to be jagged because a
small change in the delays is likely to cause the system to react to different position updates,
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leading to issuing quite different manoeuvres etc. (this is also supported by the target altitude
resolution as mentioned in Section 7.1).
Figure 7.10 shows that the VMD is stably above the ALIM threshold until the initial
delay passes 10 seconds in Scenario 1. As shown in Figure 7.11, the ALIM vertical separation
is harder to keep in Scenario 2 as the ownship has to manoeuvre further away (while crossing
through the intruders’ target altitudes at the CPA) to gain the same vertical separation as in
Scenario 1. When the delay reaches 8 seconds, the system rather stays in-between the aircraft
Table 7.6: Values of Fixed Parameters - multiple-threat encounter - Scenario 1
Ownship Intruder 1 Intruder 2
α [°] 0 45 315
TAS [m/s] 60 60 60
ROCD [feet/min] 0 -700 700
Altitude offset [feet] - 0 0
CPA time offset [s] - 0 0
Zone 3
Figure 7.10: Multiple-threat encounter - Scenario 1
Table 7.7: Values of Fixed Parameters - multiple-threat encounter - Scenario 2
Ownship Intruder 1 Intruder 2
α [°] 0 45 315
TAS [m/s] 60 60 60
ROCD [feet/min] 0 -700 700
Altitude offset [feet] 0 100 -100
CPA time offset [s] 0 0 0
Zone 3
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Figure 7.11: Multiple-threat encounter - Scenario 2
to have a separation of at least 100 feet as it does not have enough time to cross through the
predicted intruders’ altitudes. Of course this is an extreme case of two intruders who endanger
the ownship at the exact same moment and the low sensitivity level causes the ownship to
detect the intruder late. When the delay is around 6 seconds the VMD is highest because
with a bigger initial delay a higher ROCD is needed to provide ALIM at the beginning off the
DMOD-wide zone around the ownship, and the rising consequent delay causes the ownship
to level-off later than right after gaining the ALIM separation.
In Scenario 2 where the ownship is endangered both from above and below at the same
time, it is difficult to avoid collisions by using vertical manoeuvres. But in a coordinated
version of the encounter (Scenario 2) depicted in Figure 7.12, the aircraft cooperate to create
a vertical separation and they are able to keep the vertical separation for much higher time
delays. At very high values of delays (initial delay over 11 seconds etc.) the coordination
begins to fail and the ALIM vertical separation cannot be provided.
In Scenario 3, the intruders’ CPAs are separated by 5 seconds, the system is able to keep
the ALIM separation for a similar range of the initial delay as in the single-threat encounter
case. This is because, as the time offset between the intruders’ CPAs rises, the ownship gains
manoeuvring space.
7.3 Discussion of Results
The simulation in chapters 6-7 has shown the functionality of the collision avoidance
system implementation based on TCAS RA logic. The system’s ability to prevent collisions by
providing sufficient vertical separation was shown in various scenarios. The simulation using
the BADA aircraft dynamics model has shown certain limitations of the system. For high
horizontal velocities, especially in high altitude zones, the maximum thrust limits the aircraft’s
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Figure 7.12: Multiple-threat encounter - Scenario 2 - coordinated version
Table 7.8: Values of Fixed Parameters - Scenario 3
Ownship Intruder 1 Intruder 2
α [°] 0 90 270
TAS [m/s] 60 60 60
ROCD [feet/min] 0 -700 700
Altitude offset [feet] 0 100 -100
CPA time offset [s] 0 5 0
Zone 3
Figure 7.13: Multiple-threat encounter - Scenario 3
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capability to do vertical manoeuvres. This results in weaker manoeuvres than requested by the
collision avoidance system, leading to a lower VMD being reached (shown in Section 7.2.1).
The collision avoidance system has no mechanism to predict the aircraft’s incapability to
perform a vertical manoeuvre under conditions like combined high altitude and TAS. TCAS is
restricted to the aircraft which achieve specific general performance criteria like the minimum
ROCD [17]. Planned future versions of collision avoidance systems like ACAS X intend to
involve different performance criteria of different classes of aircraft in their design [17]. This
is to enable the system to be used on a variety of aircraft without general performance
restrictions. Using the BADA aircraft dynamics models, the encounter simulation shows that
the collision avoidance system would also benefit from a dynamic evaluation of aircraft’s
manoeuvring capabilities (e.g. based on the current velocity and altitude) which could be
done based on BADA performance files, for example.
The pilot response model was used to inspect how the delays affect the system’s func-
tionality. In single-threat encounters, a high initial pilot response delay led to a decrease in
the resulting VMD as depicted in Figure 7.7. Until the delay reached approximately double
the value assumed by TCAS, the VMD remained stably above the ALIM threshold. Testing a
coordinated version of the same encounters showed that the coordination allows for a slightly
higher value of delay (+2 seconds) while retaining the ALIM vertical separation (pictured
in Figure 7.9). In multiple-threat encounters, we modified parameters defining the scenarios
to show their impact on the delay/VMD characteristic. It appears that the most difficult
encounters occur when there are multiple threats whose CPAs coincide. In such a scenario
with threats both from above and below and offsets set to surround the ownship’s altitude,
the system failed to provide the ALIM separation with just slightly higher delays (an initial
pilot response delay of 8 seconds and etc., for details see Section 7.2.2) than the default values
that TCAS assumes. The coordination has shown to be very effective in dealing with such
encounters. While cooperating the aircraft managed to avoid losing the ALIM separation for
larger delay range (up to 12 seconds of initial pilot response delay etc., for details see Section
7.2.2). For even higher delays the VMD becomes unstable and the coordination is ineffective
as depicted in Figure 7.12. With just a few seconds delay between the intruders’ CPAs, the
system manages the encounter with a range of delays comparable to the single-threat encoun-
ters as depicted in Figure 7.13. Overall, the delays show a significant impact on the system’s
ability to avoid collisions. A collision avoidance system based on TCAS logic for UAVs would
benefit from the small reaction delays the autonomous pilot can provide. For single-threat
encounters and less difficult multiple-threat encounters the delays can rise to almost double
the assumed value before the system stops stably providing the ALIM vertical separation.
There is a slightly higher reserve for coordinated encounters. But in difficult uncoordinated
multiple-threat encounters just a slightly higher delay may cause loss of the ALIM separation.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to analyse the functionality of TCAS. First, we presented the
principles of operation of on-board transporders and TCAS. Next, we discussed the method-
ology used for the verification of the collision avoidance systems functionality, focusing on the
method of computational simulation analysis using the models of collision avoidance logic,
encounters, aircraft dynamics, pilot response and air traffic. Then, we implemented a collision
avoidance system based on the TCAS functionality. We verified the functionality of the subsys-
tems of the collision avoidance logic by visualising and analysing the area where the threats
are detected, and a certain type of manoeuvre is required. We introduced a parametrised
encounter model suitable for our analysis. As a whole, the collision avoidance logic imple-
mentation was then verified in various single and multiple-threat encounters using a discrete
encounter simulation with a point-mass aircraft dynamics model. Finally, we integrated the
collision avoidance logic and a parametrised model of the pilot response into an air traffic
simulation using the precise BADA aircraft dynamics models. We analysed the impact of
encounter defining parameters on the collision avoidance logic’s functionality and estimated
delay-related limitations of the system’s functionality.
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CD Contents
The names of all the root directories on the CD are listed in Table 1.
Directory name Description
thesis the thesis in PDF format
thesis sources LaTex source codes
source Java source codes
Table 1: CD Contents
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List and Meaning of Abbreviations
The abbreviations used in this thesis are listed in Table 2.
Abbreviation Meaning
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
ALIM ALtitude LIMit
BADA Base of Aircraft DAta
CD2D Conflict Detection 2-Dimensional algorithm
CPA Closest Point of Approach
DMOD Distance MODified
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
HMD Horizontal Miss Distance
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
NMAC Near Mid-Air Collision
RA Resolution Advisory
TA Traffic Advisory
TAS True AirSpeed
TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System
TIS-B Traffic Information Service - Broadcast
ROCD Rate of Climb/Descend
VMD Vertical Miss Distance
ZTHR Z- THReshold (vertical threshold for advisories)
Table 2: Lists of abbreviations
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